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INTRODUCTION 
On July 10, 1832, President Andrew Jackson issued the most 
famous and controversial veto in United States history.1  The bill 
in question was “to modify and continue” the 1816 “act to 
incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States.2  This 
was to recharter of the Second Bank of the United States whose 
constitutionality was famously upheld in McCulloch v. 
Maryland.3  The bill was passed by Congress and presented to 
Jackson on July 4.4  Six days later, Jackson vetoed the bill.  
Jackson’s veto mortally wounded the Second Bank, which would 
forever close its doors four years later at the expiration of its 
original 20-year charter in 1836.  The veto launched Jackson’s 
1832 presidential campaign, symbolized his boldness – the 
Bank’s supporters believed the veto would be sufficiently 
unpopular as to cost Jackson the election – and created the 
1.  DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICA, 1815-1848 379 (2007) (describing Jackson’s veto as the “most important 
Presidential veto in American history”); Arthur M. Schlesinger, An Impressive Mandate and 
the Meaning of Jacksonianism, in ANDREW JACKSON: A PROFILE 133 (Charles Sellers ed. 
1971) (the Bank Veto “burst like a thunderclap over the nation”).  
2. President Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), 3 A COMPILATION OF
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789–1897, at 1139 (James D. Richardson 
ed. 1898) [hereinafter Jackson, “Veto Message”]. 
3. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
4. Jackson, “Veto Message”, supra note 2, at 1139. 
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signature issue of his second term, as he dismantled the Bank’s 
role as financier to the federal government.5 
In addition to its place as a standout moment in U.S. political 
history, legal scholars and historians have also viewed the Bank 
Veto as a watershed in constitutional history.  It is taken to be a 
monumental rejection of judicial supremacy, in which the 
President defied the Supreme Court’s constitutional ruling and 
asserted the right of the president to interpret the Constitution 
independently.  Constitutional scholars view the Bank Veto as the 
archetypal statement of “departmentalism,” the view that each 
branch of the government has the power and duty to interpret the 
Constitution for itself.6  The defiance of the Supreme Court, 
according to convention, was manifested by Jackson’s rejection 
of Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch.  To sum 
up the conventional account: Marshall said the Bank was 
constitutional; Jackson said that Bank was unconstitutional. 
Departmentalism can come in several forms, however, some 
of them more defiant than others.  The conventional account at 
times seems to characterize the Bank Veto as what I will call 
“defiant departmentalism” – not just arriving at a different 
conclusion than the Supreme Court, but repudiating the Court’s 
conclusion and defying its judgment.  That extreme 
characterization of the Bank Veto is plainly wrong, as more recent 
revisionist accounts have pointed out.  In McCulloch, the 
Supreme Court said only that chartering a national bank was 
constitutionally permissible.  The case did not, and could not, say 
that a national bank was constitutionally compelled.  McCulloch 
necessarily, and unsurprisingly leaves discretionary space on 
policy grounds to reject a national bank.  Jackson’s Bank Veto 
shows that McCulloch also left space to object to a national bank 
on constitutional grounds without contradicting anything in 
Marshall’s opinion.  By leaving the “degree of necessity” to 
congressional determination, McCulloch allows legislators – and 
the President, who acts in a legislative capacity when considering 
5. See HOWE, supra note 1, at 379-82; GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, ANDREW JACKSON
AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE RISE AND FALL OF GENERATIONAL REGIMES 51-52 (2007); 
ROBERT V. REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE BANK WAR 106-07 (1967). 
6. See, e.g., KEITH WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL 
SUPREMACY 61 (2007) (asserting that Jackson’s veto “was challenging legislative 
supremacy as well as judicial supremacy”).   
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whether to sign a bill into law – to decide that a legislative 
proposal is unconstitutional for reasons not necessarily discussed 
by the Supreme Court.7  Viewed this way, Jackson’s Bank Veto 
is more accurately viewed as something much milder than defiant 
departmentalism – I will call it role-appropriate departmentalism. 
Both the conventional and the revisionist accounts are partly 
right and partly wrong.  The conventional account comports with 
the political history of the Bank Veto, but it virtually ignores most 
of the text of Jackson’s 8,100-word Bank Veto Message.  Despite 
its actual language, which as we shall see is surprisingly measured 
and non-confrontational toward the Supreme Court, the Bank 
Veto Message was viewed by many political actors then and later 
as a precedent for defiant departmentalism.  As demonstrated by 
the revisionists, the conventional account ignores the fact that 
Jackson, both in practice and in the words of the Bank Veto 
Message, claimed the right of independent constitutional 
interpretation only when acting in his legislative capacity. 
The revisionists have corrected this error by showing how a 
presidential veto can disagree with a constitutional ruling of the 
Supreme Court without defying the Court.  In so doing, the 
revisionists account for some of the otherwise inexplicable 
language in which the Bank Veto Message carefully works 
around McCulloch rather than defying it.  Yet the revisionist 
account leaves us scratching our heads as to why Jackson would 
include a departmentalist claim, however briefly, while at the 
same time treating McCulloch with surprising deference. 
In this article, I argue that both accounts are radically 
incomplete.  The Bank Veto Message was ghost-written in large 
part by two future Supreme Court justices: Secretary of the Navy 
Levi Woodbury and Attorney General Roger B. Taney.  With this 
important fact in mind, we can see the Bank Veto Message as a 
lawyerly document that can be read as a doctrinal text, much like 
a judicial opinion.  Doing so yields a new perspective.  I argue 
that Jackson’s Bank Veto Message as a legal text is a road map 
for an impending Taney Court jurisprudence of states’ rights, a 
jurisprudence that does not defy, but subtly undermines 
McCulloch’s conception of implied federal powers without 
overruling McCulloch. 
7. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 423. 
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I. BACKGROUND
A. THE FIRST AND SECOND BANKS OF THE
UNITED STATES 
The debate over a national bank was arguably the most 
significant and long-running constitutional controversy in 
antebellum America other than the debate over slavery.  The 
controversy dated back to Alexander Hamilton’s 1791 proposal 
to charter the original Bank of the United States as part of his 
package of national economic development proposals.  The bank 
bill was enacted by Congress over the constitutional objections of 
Madison in Congress, and signed into law by President 
Washington over the objections of Thomas Jefferson and Edmund 
Randolph in the cabinet, on the strength of Hamilton’s eleventh-
hour memorandum.8  In his biography of Washington, published 
in 1807, John Marshall wrote that the original Bank debate “made 
a deep impression on many members of the legislature, and 
contributed, not inconsiderably, to the complete organization of 
those distinct and visible parties, which, in their long and dubious 
conflict for power, have since shaken the United States to their 
centre.”9 
By most accounts, the First Bank fulfilled its intended 
functions effectively over the next 20 years, acting as fiscal agent 
and financier to the national government, and operating branches 
in several cities.  But by the time its charter neared its end in 1811, 
the Bank had also made political enemies.  Aside from its 
indelible association with the Federalists, the First Bank also 
tended to play a restraining central-bank role on the credit 
practices of the increasing numbers of state banks.  The bill to 
renew its charter was defeated by a single vote in both the House 
and Senate, and the First Bank closed its doors forever in 
February 1811.10 
8. David S. Schwartz, Misreading McCulloch v. Maryland, 18 U. PENN. J. CON. L. 1, 
27-38 (2015). 
9. JOHN MARSHALL, THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 354 (Robert Faulkner &
Paul Carrese ed., 2000). 
10. Schwartz, supra note 8, at 27-38. 
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The financial embarrassments to the government of trying to 
conduct the war of 1812, and the economic uncertainty generated 
by a disuniform national currency dominated by state banknotes, 
prompted calls in 1815 for Congress to charter a second national 
bank.  The leading advocate of a new national bank was the 
erstwhile bank opponent, now president, James Madison.  A bill 
chartering the Second Bank of the United States was signed into 
law by Madison on April 10, 1816.  Like its predecessor, the 
Second Bank was a private corporation, with five of its 25 
directors to be federal appointees, and 20% of the Bank’s stock to 
be owned by the federal government.11  Promptly establishing 
branch offices in sixteen states, the Second Bank made political 
enemies by aggressively competing with state-chartered private 
banks for commercial lending business.  Some state legislatures, 
seeking to improve their state banks’ competitive position, 
imposed taxes on the Bank’s operations.  At the same time, the 
Bank found itself overextended by its aggressive lending, and 
began calling in many of its loans as the economy entered a 
downturn in 1818, contributing to the Panic of 1819, the nation’s 
first major depression.  The public perception of the Bank turned 
sour.12 
McCulloch v. Maryland involved a constitutional challenge 
by the Second Bank’s branch in Baltimore to a Maryland tax 
designed to raise the Second Bank’s cost of issuing loans and 
thereby disadvantage it relative to Maryland’s own state-
chartered banks.13  On March 6, 1819, Chief Justice John 
Marshall issued an opinion that has come to be regarded as one of 
the most important constitutional decisions ever rendered by the 
Supreme Court.14  The decision upheld the constitutionality of the 
Second Bank and struck down the Maryland tax.  Marshall 
observed that the constitutionality of the bank had been settled by 
longstanding legislative precedent and acceptance by the political 
11. BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION
TO THE CIVIL WAR 244 (1957); RICHARD E. ELLIS, AGGRESSIVE NATIONALISM: 
MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND AND THE FOUNDATION OF FEDERAL AUTHORITY IN THE 
YOUNG REPUBLIC 42 (2007). 
12. MARK R. KILLENBECK, M’CULLOCH V. MARYLAND: SECURING A NATION 64-72
(2006).  
13. Mark R. Killenbeck, All Banks in Like Manner Taxed? Maryland and the Second
Bank of the United States, 2 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 44 (forthcoming 2019). 
14. Schwartz, supra note 8, at 3, 8-9.
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branches.15  Marshall agreed with these precedents that Congress 
had the implied power to charter a bank.  He rejected the 
Jeffersonian strict-constructionist argument that implied powers 
are limited to those without which a granted power would be 
nugatory.  Instead, Marshall concluded, Congress must have 
discretion to choose among any means convenient or well-
adapted to implement the government’s granted powers.16  The 
Necessary and Proper Clause confirmed this principle, 
authorizing legislative “means” that are “conducive” – not 
“absolutely or indispensably necessary” to the “legitimate ends” 
of the government.17  The Bank, Marshall concluded, was “a 
convenient, a useful, and essential instrument” in conducting the 
national government’s “fiscal operations.”18 
Having decided that the Second Bank was constitutional, the 
McCulloch opinion turned to the question of whether Maryland 
could tax it.  The essence of federal supremacy is to remove all 
obstacles to federal government action within its sphere, and state 
taxation was a potential obstacle.19  The power to tax is a power 
to regulate and even destroy what is taxed, limited only by the 
political wishes of constituents.  For that reason, the states’ 
sovereign power of taxation extends only to powers that can be 
conferred by the state’s own constituents.  States cannot tax 
operations of the federal government, because a part cannot 
control the whole.20 
McCulloch was a controversial decision, widely approved by 
supporters of national economic development and sharply 
criticized by states’ rights advocates.21  The Court turned aside a 
renewed attack on the Second Bank in Osborn v. Bank of the 
United States (1824),22 in which the state of Ohio argued that it 
was entitled to tax the Second Bank’s non-governmental 
business.23  While the Second Bank successfully played a central 
banking role throughout the 1820s under the leadership of its 
15. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 401-02.
16. Id. at 406-10.
17. Id. at 411-15, 418-20. 
18. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 422.
19. Id. at 427-28.
20. Id. at 427-28, 431-32. 
21. See Schwartz, supra note 8, at 57-58.
22. 22 U.S. 738 (1824).
23. Id. at 739-41.
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President, Nicholas Biddle, opposition to the Bank coalesced 
around the presidency of Andrew Jackson, one of its fiercest 
critics.24 
B. THE BANK RECHARTER BILL AND VETO
Although the Second Bank had not been an issue in the 1828 
presidential campaign, Andrew Jackson’s hostility toward it 
became increasingly evident during his first term in office.  In his 
first annual message to Congress in 1829, Jackson questioned 
whether the Bank’s charter should be renewed when it expired in 
1836.  In his second annual message, he proposed to strip the 
Second Bank of “the influence which makes that bank 
formidable,” perhaps by incorporating it into the Treasury.  
Although his proposals gained no traction in Congress, his 
opposition to the Second Bank, which he called “the Monster,” 
was sufficiently clear to create a quandary for its president, 
Nicholas Biddle, once it became known that Jackson would seek 
re-election.  Biddle had been advised that the Second Bank was 
sufficiently popular to secure passage of a recharter bill in 
Congress.  He calculated that the Bank’s popularity would make 
Jackson reluctant to veto a recharter bill in an election year; once 
re-elected, Jackson would be much more likely to indulge his 
anti-bank prejudice and veto a recharter bill.  Henry Clay, the 
National Republican candidate for president in 1832, believed 
that a recharter bill in 1832 would place Jackson in a bind: either 
Jackson would yield to the perceived popularity of the Bank, or 
he would veto the bank bill and face the electoral consequences.  
With encouragement from National Republicans, Biddle applied 
to Congress for an early recharter of the Bank, in January 1832.  
A recharter bill was reported out by the House Ways and Means 
Committee in February and eventually passed by Congress and 
submitted to Jackson on July 4, 1832. 25 
On July 10, Jackson issued his famous Bank Veto 
Message.26  This 8,100-word, 48-paragraph statement of reasons 
24. HOWE, supra note 1, at 378; REMINI, supra note 5, at 47; ERIC LOMAZOFF,
RECONSTRUCTING THE NATIONAL BANK CONTROVERSY: POLITICS AND LAW IN THE 
EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 142-46 (2018). 
25. HOWE, supra note 1, at 376-79. 
26. Jackson, “Veto Message”, supra note 2.
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for the veto was the work of several of Jackson’s advisors and 
cabinet members.  Undoubtedly, Jackson was attempting to reach 
multiple constituencies, including both his populist base and 
moderate bank supporters in his own party.  The message 
included both policy and constitutional objections to the bill, 
along with red-meat populist attacks on special interests and 
foreigners, and some ambiguous generalities about presidential 
power that can indeed be read as defiant departmentalism.  But 
the departmentalism was largely aimed at Congress: Jackson was 
keen to assert the president’s independent constitutional role in 
deciding the wisdom of legislation.  Historical precedent 
suggested that presidential vetoes should be exercised only on 
constitutional, and not policy grounds.  Jackson is noted for 
pushing the veto power into the realm of policy discretion, but in 
1832, he apparently remained uncertain about his right to do this. 
Instead, he produced a hybrid based on both policy and 
constitutional objections.  Thus, the message also included 
numerous constitutional objections to the bill, but these may have 
been motivated less by a defiant intention to rebuff the Supreme 
Court than by reticence to aggressively assert the president’s 
power to issue a purely policy-based veto.  Indeed, the 
constitutional arguments were presented in a subtle and lawyerly 
fashion, as if intended to be read as a legal brief asking the 
Supreme Court to distinguish McCulloch rather than overrule it.  
At no time did the message actually state that McCulloch was 
wrongly decided. 
We can plausibly speculate that the political features of the 
veto message were written by Jackson’s political advisors, his 
nephew and private secretary, Andrew Jackson Donelson, and 
Amos Kendall, who functioned informally as Jackson’s chief of 
staff and most influential advisor.27  After Kendall wrote a first 
draft, Jackson sent for Taney to come down to Washington from 
Annapolis to revise it.  Over the next three days, Taney worked 
with Donelson and Levi Woodbury on revisions, while Jackson 
“passed in and out of the room, listening to the different parts, 
weighing the various suggestions, and directing what should be 
inserted or altered.”28  Thus, the Bank Veto Message contained 
27. Mark Renfred Cheathem, A JACKSON MAN: AMOS KENDALL AND THE RISE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (REVIEW), 25 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 146-48 (2005). 
28. Schlesinger, supra note 1, at 133.
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substantial input from two future Supreme Court Justices.  Taney 
would be appointed Chief Justice, to succeed John Marshall, in 
1836.  Woodbury, after cabinet service in both the Jackson and 
Van Buren administrations, would be appointed Associate Justice 
to succeed Joseph Story, in 1845.  The legal sophistication of 
these two men undoubtedly exceeded that of Kendall, who 
became a career newspaper editor after only a very brief legal 
practice.29 
II. THE CONVENTIONAL ACCOUNT AND ITS
CRITICS 
A. THE CONVENTIONAL ACCOUNT
The conventional account maintains that Jackson’s Bank 
Veto defied the Supreme Court by rejecting McCulloch’s 
reasoning and result.  The Supreme Court had said that the Second 
Bank was constitutional.  Jackson said it wasn’t.  But for a few 
details, end of story. Though this describes the conventional 
account with a broad brush, conventional wisdoms are most 
readily found in broad brush accounts.  A conventional account 
may begin as a detailed narrative, but what makes it conventional 
is the very fact of its frequent, shorthand repetition.  These 
repetitions, which may be little more than a sentence or the 
framing of a related point, generate and replicate a useful sort of 
short-form knowledge.  One doesn’t have to read the Bank Veto 
Message every time one wants to make a point about presidential 
vetoes, or party politics or economy in antebellum America.  But 
once the conventional narrative takes over, it displaces a careful 
reading of the original source, even for those who wish to make a 
point about how to interpret the Veto Message itself. 
Among one-sentence summaries of the Bank Veto Message, 
the following are typical:  Jackson’s veto message was an “attack 
on the constitutionality of the bank and on McCulloch.”30 It was 
a “striking declaration of independence from the other branches 
of government” in which Jackson “gave no deference to the views 
29. Id. 
30. Steven G. Calabresi, Text, Precedent, and the Constitution: Some Originalist And
Normative Arguments For Overruling Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 311, 325 (2005).  
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of . . . the Supreme Court.”31 McCulloch was “functionally 
overruled by the electorate’s vindication of Jackson’s bank 
veto.”32 
To some extent, the conventional account comes from 
historians who do not normally emphasize doctrinal readings of 
legal texts.  The Bank Veto “maintain[ed] a strict construction of 
the Constitution against an activist Supreme Court,” in the words 
of Daniel Walker Howe.33  “In spite of Marshall’s repeated 
Supreme Court decisions, Jackson rehashed arguments against 
the constitutionality of the Bank, taking the position that the 
executive and legislative branches were not bound by the 
judiciary and could judge constitutional questions for 
themselves.”34  The great Jackson biographer Robert Remini 
likewise read the Bank Veto Message as a statement of defiant 
departmentalism, and a direct repudiation of McCulloch.  Jackson 
“noted that the Supreme Court in the case McCulloch vs. 
Maryland had judged the Bank constitutional. ‘To this conclusion 
I can not assent,’ announced Jackson.”35  This is a misquotation: 
Jackson withheld his assent from the conclusion that the Supreme 
Court had settled the question in all its aspects, and he took pains 
to argue that the Court had not fully considered all the 
constitutional issues.  Jackson biographer Jon Meacham 
recognizes this latter point yet still places the Veto in the defiant-
departmentalist narrative: “Jackson had made it clear that he 
interpreted the Court’s ruling in McCulloch v. Maryland . . . as 
inconclusive. But he also had made it clear that it hardly 
mattered—that he was bound to interpret the laws as he 
understood them regardless of what the Court said.”36 
31. John Yoo, Judicial Supremacy Has Its Limits, 20 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 15 
(2015). 
32. Gerald Leonard, Party as a “Political Safeguard of Federalism”: Martin Van
Buren and the Constitutional Theory of Party Politics, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 221, 277 (2001). 
33. HOWE, supra note 1, at 381.
34. Id. at 379-80. 
35. ROBERT V. REMINI, THE LIFE OF ANDREW JACKSON 151 (1988); see also id. (“In
effect what Jackson said was that no member of the tripartite government can escape his 
responsibility to consider the constitutionality of all bills and act as his knowledge and good 
judgment dictate.”) Elsewhere, Remini recognizes, as the revisionists do, that Jackson’s 
claim was limited to his legislative role. See 2 ROBERT V. REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON AND 
THE COURSE OF AMERICAN FREEDOM, 1822-1832, at 367-68 (1998). 
36. JON MEACHAM, AMERICAN LION: ANDREW JACKSON IN THE WHITE HOUSE 211
(2008). 
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Constitutional scholars have fed the narrative too.  The 
conventional narrative has been congenial to scholars espousing 
popular constitutionalism, as well as to legal and political science 
scholars writing in the “constitutional development” vein.  Thus, 
for example, Mark Graber concludes that “Jackson challenged 
judicial authority to determine the constitutional status of the 
national bank.”37  Gerard Magliocca reads the Bank Veto 
Message as “a detailed critique of Marshall’s analysis” in 
McCulloch, in which Jackson “expressed deep skepticism about 
the implied power of Congress.”38  Jackson, writes Keith 
Whittington, “rejected both Chief Justice John Marshall’s specific 
constitutional reasoning and the Court’s authority to bind the 
other departments to its particular understanding of constitutional 
requirements.”39 Whittington believes that defiant 
departmentalism was logically entailed by Jackson’s decision to 
veto the bank bill.40 
The focus of these writers is typically on non-judicial 
interpreters of the Constitution, and the constitutional meaning 
created by what they call constitutional politics.  They have 
therefore overlooked the extent to which the Bank Veto Message 
is a remarkable doctrinal statement, and not simply a political act 
with constitutional implications.  This has caused them to neglect 
the Bank Veto Message’s lawyerly effort to distinguish 
McCulloch and accept its major doctrinal holdings about things 
other than the Bank.  Indeed, the conventional account tends to be 
vague about exactly what aspects of McCulloch Jackson was 
disagreeing with.  Conventionalists mistakenly assume that by 
disagreeing with McCulloch on the bottom-line constitutionality 
of the Bank, Jackson repudiated every aspect of Marshall’s 
decision. 
A popular idea among constitutional development theorists 
is to read Jackson’s Bank Veto as a prelude to a judicial 
overruling of McCulloch that would occur once the Court became 
37. Mark Graber, Popular Constitutionalism, Judicial Supremacy, And The Complete
Lincoln-Douglas Debates, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 923, 931 (2006). 
38. Gerard N. Magliocca, A New Approach to Congressional Power: Revisiting the
Legal Tender Cases, 95 GEO. L.J. 119, 130 (2006). 
39. WHITTINGTON, supra note 6, at 59.
40. Id. (“In order to veto the bank bill, Jackson would have to reject the Court’s
authority to settle the constitutional issue.”); id. at 60 (“The rejection of judicial supremacy 
was a necessary step in Jackson’s argument”). 
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fully Jacksonian.  According to this theory, the 1840 election of 
pro-Bank Whig majorities to Congress and a pro-Bank Whig 
president, William Henry Harrison, should have produced a Third 
Bank of the United States.  The Taney Court, these scholars have 
argued, was primed to overrule McCulloch as soon as a case 
challenging the Third Bank reached the Court.  But Harrison died 
just one month into his presidency, and his successor, the states’-
rights-oriented John Tyler, vetoed the two bank charter bills 
passed by Congress.  It is said that this historical accident saved 
McCulloch from oblivion.41  As I will argue, this view, too, is 
probably wrong. 
B. THE REVISIONIST ACCOUNT
A revisionist view has been generated by lawyers and legal 
historians, who have read the Bank Veto Message somewhat 
more closely.  The primary insight of the revisionist accounts has 
been to highlight the structure of the legal problem.  By holding 
that the Constitution permits Congress to charter a national bank, 
the Supreme Court manifestly did not say that chartering a 
national bank was constitutionally compelled.  The national 
government is always free to use less than all of its powers.42 
Jackson’s disagreement with McCulloch’s conclusion about 
the constitutionality of the Bank thus does not logically entail a 
rejection of judicial supremacy.  As G. Edward White 
summarized, Jackson’s constitutional authority to veto the Bank 
recharter bill “was a function of his Article I veto power, not of 
his unofficial or official status as a constitutional interpreter.”43 
The Veto Message thus “could be boiled down to the proposition 
that when the president acts in a ‘legislative capacity’ by vetoing 
Congressional legislation, the Supreme Court cannot control his 
41. 1 HOWARD GILLMAN, MARK A. GRABER, KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 200 (2d ed. 2017) (presidential vetoes of bank bills “presidential 
vetoes explain why the Supreme Court during the Jacksonian Era did not reconsider the 
Marshall Court’s decision in McCulloch”); Mark A. Graber, Naked Land Transfers and 
American Constitutional Development, 53 VAND. L. REV. 73, 112 (2000); Magliocca, supra 
note 38, at 130.   
42. See G. Edward White, The Constitutional Journey of Marbury v. Madison, 89 VA.
L. REV. 1463, 1496 (2003); Kermit Roosevelt, III, Polyphonic Stare Decisis: Listening to
Non-Article III Actors, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1303, 1326-27 (2008). Trevor W. Morrison,
Constitutional Alarmism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1688, 1697 (2011).
43. White, supra note 42, at 1497. 
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conduct. That proposition arguably says nothing about which 
institution is the superior interpreter in ‘ordinary’ cases testing the 
constitutionality of legislative or executive acts.”44  More pithily, 
White concluded, “Marbury was not an effort to say that before 
passing legislation Congress or the president needed to check 
with the Supreme Court.”45 
Viewed this way, Jackson’s Bank Veto was not an instance 
of defiant departmentalism.46  Consider, in contrast, the actions 
of President Lincoln and the Civil War and Reconstruction 
Congresses.  Between 1858 and 1862, Lincoln argued for 
departmentalism on behalf of both political branches, and with 
Congress, acted on those arguments.  In his debates against 
Stephen Douglas in the 1858 Illinois Senate campaign, Lincoln 
repeatedly expressed opposition to the Dred Scott decision, 
arguing that it was not binding as a general constitutional rule on 
the other branches of government.47  He even cited Jackson’s 
Bank Veto to argue the legitimacy of politically overruling a 
Supreme Court decision, as he proposed to do with Dred Scott.48  
Lincoln crystalized his theory of departmentalism in his First 
Inaugural address in March 1861. 
I do not forget the position assumed by some that 
constitutional questions are to be decided by the 
Supreme Court, nor do I deny that such decisions must 
be binding in any case upon the parties to a suit as to 
the object of that suit, while they are also entitled to 
very high respect and consideration in all parallel cases 
by all other departments of the Government. And while 
it is obviously possible that such decision may be 
erroneous in any given case, still the evil effect 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 1496.
46. See Lawrence G. Sager, Courting Disaster, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1361, 1366 
(2005) (distinguishing aggressive “alpha” departmentalism from milder “beta” 
departmentalism). 
47. Abraham Lincoln, First Debate, at Ottawa, Aug. 21, 1858; Fifth Debate, at 
Galesburg, Oct. 7, 1858; Sixth Debate, at Quincy, Oct. 13, 1858, in 3 THE COLLECTED 
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 28, 232, 278 (1955) [hereinafter “COLLECTED WORKS”]. 
48. “Will you not graciously allow us to do with the Dred Scott decision precisely as
you did with the Bank decision?”  Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Springfield, July 17, 1858, 2 
COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 47, at 519. 
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following it, being limited to that particular case, with 
the chance that it may be overruled and never become a 
precedent for other cases, can better be borne than could 
the evils of a different practice. At the same time, the 
candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the 
Government upon vital questions affecting the whole 
people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the 
Supreme Court, the instant they are made in ordinary 
litigation between parties in personal actions the people 
will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that 
extent practically resigned their Government into the 
hands of that eminent tribunal.49 
In contrast to Jackson’s presidency, the Lincoln 
administration and Congress acted on these defiant 
departmentalist ideas.  Repudiating Dred Scott’s holding that free 
black people could not be citizens of the United States, Secretary 
of State William Seward ordered his department to issue 
passports to free blacks.50  The Civil War Congress overruled 
Dred Scott directly by banning slavery in the territories by statute 
in 1862.51  And in 1866, two years before the Fourteenth 
Amendment overruled Dred Scott’s holding on citizenship, the 
Reconstruction Congress provided in the Civil Rights Act of 
1866,  that “all persons born in the United States and not subject 
to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby 
declared to be citizens of the United States.”52 These actions 
directly defied a holding of the Supreme Court.  Jackson’s Bank 
Veto did not. 
A more troubling instance of executive defiance of the 
judiciary was Lincoln’s reaction to Taney’s decision in Ex Parte 
Merryman (1861).  Sitting as circuit judge, Taney ruled that the 
military detention of John Merryman, an alleged pro-secession 
49. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, in 4 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note
47, at 268.  
50. BARRY E. FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 120 
(2009). 
51. An Act to Secure Freedom to all Persons within the Territories of the United States
ch. 111., 12 Stat. 432 (1862). 
52. An Act to Protect All Persons in the United States in Their Civil Rights, and
Furnish the Means of Their Vindication, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). 
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saboteur, was unconstitutional because the President had no 
authority to suspend habeas corpus without congressional 
action.53  Taney had the opinion delivered to the White House; 
Lincoln simply ignored it.54 
C. APPRAISAL
My argument is not a Hegelian synthesis that harmonizes an 
initial conventional “thesis” and a revisionist “antithesis.”  
Rather, my aim is to offer a supplement and partial correction to 
both readings, in the form of a doctrinal overlay.  The revisionist 
account is successful in demonstrating the error in the 
conventional account: the mistaken premise that rejecting 
McCulloch was a necessary step in Jackson’s argument.  The 
revisionists also tend to read the Bank Veto Message somewhat 
more closely than the conventionalists, emphasizing that Jackson 
offered a series of particular objections to the Bank.  Yet the 
revisionists also have a way of missing the big picture. 
The conventional account may have read the political history 
well, but it reads the document poorly.  The conventional reading 
is right that the Bank Veto Message was a rejection of McCulloch, 
but for the wrong reasons.  The Bank Veto Message manifestly 
did not signal an intention to overrule McCulloch.  It did not reject 
the conclusions that implied powers are those “conducive” to 
executing the express powers of the government, that Congress 
had an implied power to charter a national bank of some sort, and 
that the operations of the federal government cannot be taxed by 
the states.  Instead, the Veto Message subtly undermined 
McCulloch by taking a series of small but cumulatively 
devastating doctrinal bites out of it, like the sharks that 
successively attacked Santiago’s marlin in Hemingway’s The Old 
Man and the Sea. 
53. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861).
54. JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 288
(1988). 
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III. A CLOSE READING OF THE BANK VETO
MESSAGE 
A. INTRODUCTION AND POLICY ARGUMENTS
Given the Bank Veto’s reputation as a repudiation of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in McCulloch, it is curious that Jackson 
does not even mention the Supreme Court’s decision upholding 
the Bank until nearly halfway through the forty-seven-paragraph, 
8,100-word essay.55  Indeed, he barely mentions the Constitution 
in this segment.  His opening paragraph makes a fling at the pro-
Bank majority in Congress, which forwarded the Bank bill on 
July 4 as a sort of political publicity stunt.  Jackson deftly turned 
this around: “Having considered [the bill] with that solemn regard 
to the principles of the Constitution which the day was calculated 
to inspire,” Jackson concluded that the bill “ought not to become 
a law.”56  In his only mention of a constitutional principle in the 
first section of the Veto Message, Jackson actually embraces 
Marshall’s interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause.  “A 
bank of the United States,” Jackson said, “is in many respects 
convenient for the Government and useful to the people.”57  
Jackson “entertain[ed] this opinion,” but was “deeply impressed 
with the belief that some of the powers and privileges possessed 
by the existing bank are unauthorized by the Constitution” and 
are left uncorrected by the recharter bill.58 
Despite the constitutional gloss, Jackson devoted the next 
seventeen paragraphs to an exposition of three policy arguments 
against the Bank.  First, he argued that the secondary market in 
the Bank’s stock, which was expected to produce stock sales 
above par, would result in windfall profits to a small number of 
the “richest class” of citizens and to numerous foreign owners.59  
Because this provision goes against “justice and good policy,” 
Jackson argued, it alone gave “ample reasons why [the bill] 
should not become a law.”60  Jackson then objected to the 
55. Jackson, “Veto Message”, supra note 2, at 1144. 
56. Id. at 1139.
57. Id. 
58. Id. (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 1140.
60. Id. at 1141.
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“odious” provision privileging state banks to redeem Second 
Bank notes at any branch, while “a merchant, mechanic, or other 
private citizen” could do so only at the St. Louis branch, which 
would unfairly force such individuals in most cases to sell their 
Second Bank notes at a discount.61  Finally, Jackson offered a 
complex argument against aspects of the bill that facilitated 
foreign ownership of Bank stock.  While he concluded that this 
feature of the Bank Bill made the bank a “danger to our liberty 
and independence,” he did not say it was unconstitutional.62  On 
the contrary, he concluded by saying, “If we must have a bank 
with private stockholders, every consideration of sound policy 
and every impulse of American feeling admonishes that it should 
be purely American.”63 
B. THE DEPARTMENTALIST WINDOW-DRESSING
After 19 paragraphs and 3,100 words, Jackson finally 
advanced the constitutional argument that has captured the 
attention of contemporary and subsequent readers of the Bank 
Veto Message, and which has fueled the conventional account. 
In paragraph 20, Jackson claimed to rebut the argument by 
“advocates of the bank that its constitutionality in all its features 
ought to be considered as settled by precedent and by the decision 
of the Supreme Court.”64  Some readers, such as Larry Kramer, 
have misinterpreted that sentence as an attack on McCulloch, but 
it should be parsed with care.65  For starters, notice how Jackson 
treats “precedent and . . . the decision of the Supreme Court” as 
distinct things.  As Gerard Magliocca has observed, the thrust of 
Jackson’s argument here was first and foremost, to challenge the 
force of legislative precedent.66  But the challenge is more limited 
than the conventional account acknowledges.  Jackson recognizes 
the binding force of legislative precedent “where the 
acquiescence of the people and the States can be considered as 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 1144.
63. Id. (emphasis added).
64. Id. 
65. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 189 (2004). 
66. Gerard N. Magliocca, Veto! The Jacksonian Revolution in Constitutional Law, 78 
NEB. L. REV. 205, 222 (1999) (emphasis added). 
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well settled.”67  But Jackson then purported to fight the historical 
question of pro-Bank precedent to a draw, noting that while two 
legislative sessions approved a national bank (1791 and 1816), 
two rejected it (1811 and 1815), and state legislative judgments 
tended to run against the Bank.68  Whether Jackson read the 
history correctly is immaterial: the point is that he did not baldly 
assert a presidential prerogative to disregard well-established 
legislative precedent, but instead argued that the precedent in 
question was not well-established. 
To be sure, Marshall in McCulloch concluded that legislative 
precedent strongly favored the Bank.69  Whether Jackson’s 
interpretation on this point was better or worse than Marshall’s, 
his factual disagreement with the Supreme Court on how to read 
extra-judicial historical precedent is hardly an earth-shaking 
challenge to the Supreme Court. 
Paragraph 21 of the Bank Veto Message offers the strongest 
statement of departmentalism. 
If the opinion of the Supreme Court covered the whole 
ground of this act, it ought not to control the coordinate 
authorities of this Government. The Congress, the 
Executive, and the Court must each for itself be guided by 
its own opinion of the Constitution. Each public officer who 
takes an oath to support the Constitution swears that he will 
support it as he understands it, and not as it is understood by 
others. It is as much the duty of the House of 
Representatives, of the Senate, and of the President to decide 
upon the constitutionality of any bill or resolution which may 
be presented to them for passage or approval as it is of the 
supreme judges when it may be brought before them for 
judicial decision. The opinion of the judges has no more 
authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress has 
over the judges, and on that point the President is 
independent of both. The authority of the Supreme Court 
must not, therefore, be permitted to control the Congress or 
the Executive when acting in their legislative capacities, but 
67. Jackson, “Veto Message”, supra note 2, at 1144-45. 
68. Id. at 1145.
69. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 401.
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to have only such influence as the force of their reasoning 
may deserve.70 
If we take it in isolation and soften our focus, this paragraph 
seems to justify the conventional view, that Jackson was girding 
his loins to defy McCulloch.  But that requires that we ignore the 
italicized language (italicized by me).  On its face, this passage 
does not assert a blanket authority to defy or ignore judicial 
decisions, such as Lincoln’s disregard of Merryman.  As the 
revisionists correctly point out, Jackson’s declaration of 
independence from the Supreme Court is limited to the 
president’s exercise of his legislative function under the veto 
clause. 
Moreover, reading the paragraph in context diminishes its 
force considerably.  To begin with, the entire statement is 
rendered hypothetical.  The condition implied by its opening 
qualifier, “If,” was not met, in Jackson’s view, because 
McCulloch did not cover the whole ground: “But in the case relied 
upon the Supreme Court [has] not decided that all the features of 
this corporation are compatible with the Constitution.”71  Jackson 
went on to frame his objections as though they were consistent 
with McCulloch’s primary holdings regarding implied powers: 
that Congress has implied powers, that “necessary” means 
“conducive to,” and that the degree of necessity is a question for 
legislative judgment.72 
The strength of the departmentalist language is further 
weakened by the non-defiant structure of the problem (as noted 
above) that McCulloch could not, and did not, compel Congress 
to charter a Bank having particular features, or any Bank, but 
merely ruled that the Constitution permitted Congress to do so.  
The opinion left subsequent congresses perfectly free to decide 
not to exercise their full powers. Even if subsequent congresses 
were to base a refusal to charter a  bank on a narrower view of 
constitutional powers than Marshall’s, such legislative 
interpretations were not foreclosed by McCulloch, since they fit 
comfortably within McCulloch’s framework of ultimate 
70. Jackson, “Veto Message”, supra note 2, at 1145 (emphasis added).
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 1145-46.
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legislative discretion on the necessity question.  Jackson took this 
very tack, and simply asserted the President’s right, under the veto 
clause, to exercise this judgment himself.  Jackson’s language 
could be read expansively to say that the President and Congress 
have the power to defy constitutional limits imposed by the 
Supreme Court, but the Bank Veto Message in practice did not do 
this.  In the context of vetoing the bank bill, this passage can also 
be read to say merely that Congress and the president have the 
right to self-limit their powers to something less than the Supreme 
Court would allow.  The broader implications of the 
departmentalism paragraph, had they been found in a judicial 
opinion, would be denigrated as obiter dicta. 
In paragraphs 22 through 24, Jackson summarized a broad 
holding of McCulloch with surprising accuracy and fidelity: 
Having satisfied themselves that the word “necessary” in the 
Constitution means “needful,” “requisite,” “essential,” 
“conducive to,” and that “a bank” is a convenient, a useful, 
and essential instrument in the prosecution of the 
Government’s “fiscal operations,” they conclude that to “use 
one must be within the discretion of Congress” and that “the 
act to incorporate the Bank of the United States is a law made 
in pursuance of the Constitution[.]”73 
While purporting to accept the McCulloch ruling only for the 
sake of argument, (“Without commenting on the general principle 
affirmed by the Supreme Court . . .”), Jackson proceeded to 
endorse the principle affirmed in McCulloch that 
the “degree of its necessity,” involving all the details of a 
banking institution, is a question exclusively for legislative 
consideration. A bank is constitutional, but it is the province 
of the Legislature to determine whether this or that particular 
power, privilege, or exemption is “necessary and proper” to 
enable the bank to discharge its duties to the Government, 
and from their decision there is no appeal to the courts of 
justice.74 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 1146 (emphasis added).
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Here, the revisionists have read the Veto Message better than 
the conventionalists.  Jackson asserted a well-precedented 
constitutional argument about the president’s legislative role.  
The president has the right and duty under the Veto Clause to 
make an independent judgment about the constitutionality of a 
bill presented to him.  The precedent for this is no less than 
Washington’s consideration of the original bank bill in 1791.75  
Neither Hamilton nor anyone else at the time argued that 
Washington was bound by the congressional determination that 
the original bank bill was constitutional; on the contrary, all 
assumed that Washington should consider the bill’s 
constitutionality.76  True, there was no judicial precedent on the 
books at that time.  But as Jackson rightly pointed out, McCulloch 
leaves judgments about necessity to the legislative process.  
Jackson merely asserted the claim that the Constitution makes the 
president part of that process.  Nothing in McCulloch suggests 
that the Court’s judgment on the constitutionality of the Bank is 
more binding on a presidential veto decision than Congress’s 
judgment was on Washington. 
C. THE CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS
Only at this point, about halfway through, did the Bank Veto 
Message finally proceed to Jackson’s constitutional objections to 
the Bank bill itself.  The most notable feature of these 
constitutional objections is the length to which Jackson went to 
frame them as consistent with McCulloch.  Jackson purported to 
“examine the details” of the Bank Bill “in accordance with the 
rule of legislative action” which McCulloch “laid down.”77  In 
doing so, he did not overtly challenge any of McCulloch’s three 
doctrinal principles: that Congress has implied powers to enact 
legislative means that are “conducive” to implementing the 
75. Letter from George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, Nat’l Archives (Feb. 16,
1791), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-08-02-0047 
[https://perma.cc/WDB9-XL75]. 
76. Sec’y of Treasury Alexander Hamilton, Final Version of an Opinion on the
Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank (Feb. 23, 1791), 
https://founders.archives.gov/?q=Ancestor%3AARHN-01-08-02-
0060&s=1511311111&r=3 [https://perma.cc/RTA4-E2DQ].   
77. Jackson, “Veto Message”, supra note 2, at 1146.
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government’s express powers;78 that federal law is supreme over 
state law;79 and that states cannot tax the operations of the federal 
government.80  In fact, paragraphs 24 through 35 reflect a careful 
and lawyerly effort to distinguish rather than repudiate 
McCulloch.  Jackson began by stating that McCulloch had “not 
decided that all the features of this corporation are compatible 
with the Constitution.”81 That is partly true. McCulloch held that 
Congress could charter a private banking corporation to carry out 
the government’s “fiscal operations” as an implied power.82  In 
theory, one could argue that by doing so, the Court approved the 
constitutionality of every specific feature of the Second Bank.  
But in practice, that is not how judicial precedent works: a 
subsequent Court, including the Marshall Court, would always 
have considered itself free to review the constitutionality of 
particular aspects of the corporate charter that were not expressly 
argued and considered in the original case. 
Jackson offered constitutional objections to three features of 
the Bank bill: the monopoly charter, foreign share ownership, and 
the Bank’ private character. 
The Monopoly Charter. Jackson made two constitutional 
objections to the Bank’s monopoly privileges.  First, he argued 
that the grant of a monopoly ceded Congress’s implied powers to 
charter other banks to conduct governmental fiscal affairs.83  
Since most legislative choices entail foregoing the power to 
78. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 415.  A significant and growing literature argues that the
federal government is recognized to have important powers that are neither enumerated nor 
means to carry out those that are.  See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, A Question Perpetually 
Arising: Implied Powers, Capable Federalism and the Limits of Enumerationism, 59 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 573, 573-74 (2017) [hereinafter Schwartz, A Question Perpetually Arising]; Robert
J. Reinstein, The Implied Powers of the United States (article draft on file with author); John
Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1047 (2014); Richard
Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, 124 YALE. L.J. 576, 578 (2014); Calvin H. Johnson, The
Dubious Enumerated Powers Doctrine, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 25, 25-26 (2005).  Arguably,
McCulloch is best read as supporting this idea.  See John Mikhail, McCulloch’s Strategic
Ambiguity (article draft on file with author); DAVID S. SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE
CONSTITUTION, chapter 3 (forthcoming 2019). I will cabin that point to avoid a controversy
tangential to my argument here.
79. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 405-06, 424, 426.
80. Id. at 436. 
81. Jackson, “Veto Message”, supra note 2, at 1145. 
82. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 422.
83. Jackson, “Veto Message”, supra note 2, at 1147.
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implement other means not chosen, at least temporarily, the 
argument is specious, if not nonsensical. 
A slightly more plausible objection to the monopoly grant 
was Jackson’s argument based on the Patent and Copyright 
Clause.  Congress’s enumerated power to grant “exclusive right” 
to “authors and inventors,” Jackson argued, implied a lack of 
power to grant exclusive rights to others for purposes other than 
“[t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts.”84  This 
rigid expressio unius interpretation of an express power grant 
stands in some tension with McCulloch, as we will see. 
Foreign shareholding. Jackson reprised his policy argument 
against the Bank Bill’s encouragement of foreign shareholding 
through exemption from state and national taxes, this time 
suggesting that the provisions were unconstitutional because they 
were not “necessary and proper” to the Bank’s functioning.85  
Also unnecessary and improper was the grant to the Bank of a 
power to acquire property, which was based on another expressio 
unius argument: the power to purchase lands for “forts, [etc.] . . . 
and other needful buildings” impliedly denied Congress the 
power to purchase lands for other purposes, Jackson argued.86 
Private Character. Jackson objected to the Bank’s private 
character, in two respects.  First, “the principle laid down by the 
Supreme Court” in McCulloch could not support an implied 
power to create a Bank for purposes other than executing the 
government’s delegated powers; therefore, Congress could not 
empower the Bank to engage in private, for-profit activities.87  
Second, in a kind of antecedent to the twentieth-century non-
delegation doctrine, Jackson argued that it was unconstitutional 
for Congress to delegate to a private corporation the power to 
decide where to locate branches or to exercise a power to regulate 
currency which might be impliedly granted to Congress – Jackson 
did not commit himself on this point – by the Coinage Clause.88  
Some centrist Jeffersonian and Jacksonian supporters of the Bank 
84. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
85. Id. at 1147-48. 
86. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17).
87. Jackson, “Veto Message”, supra note 2, at 1147-48. 
88. Id. at 1149-50 (emphasis added).  Jackson said, “if [Congress] have other power
to regulate currency,” it must “be exercised by themselves, and not . . . transferred to a 
corporation.”  Id.  See also U.S. CONST Art. I., § 8, cl. 5 (granting power “to coin money and 
regulate the value thereof”).  
2019 DEFYING MCCULLOCH? 153 
had relied on the Coinage Clause as a relatively narrow alternative 
to the Necessary and Proper Clause as a constitutional basis.  
Jackson’s argument is noteworthy as an attempt to foreclose that 
argument and force his supporters to back him up in his fight 
against the Bank.89 
These arguments have a double character.  On the one hand, 
they can be read as avoiding any overt challenge to McCulloch.  
Arguably, they are not constitutional arguments at all.  To 
Jackson, the same qualities that caused these features to fail his 
version of the “necessary and proper” test also made them bad 
policy.  If we take seriously the idea that the “degree of necessity” 
of legislative means is a question of legislative judgment, then all 
of these arguments could have been framed as policy arguments 
(as indeed, some of them were) to the same effect as his 
purportedly constitutional arguments.  Even if we view the 
arguments as constitutional, it remains the case that Jackson tried 
to pitch them as though McCulloch had left the various questions 
open, thereby seeming to avoid a direct repudiation of the 
Supreme Court’s decision. 
On the other hand, Jackson’s constitutional objections to the 
Bank’s monopoly privileges and private character stand in tension 
with McCulloch.  To begin with, not all of these questions were 
in fact left open by the Marshall Court.  McCulloch had expressly 
affirmed the constitutionality of delegating branch location 
decisions to the Bank, and had implicitly approved the use of a 
private corporation to conduct public business.90  The latter issue 
became manifest in Osborn, where the Court reasoned that the 
Bank’s for-profit activities were necessary and proper to making 
the Bank a viable concern that would have the capacity to act as 
the government’s fiscal agent and primary lender.91  Jackson’s 
objections to these conclusions contradict McCulloch and 
Osborn.  Writ large, Jackson could be seen as sketching out a 
broad constitutional principle against privatization of 
89. LOMAZOFF, supra note 24, at 141-42. 
90. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 424. (“The branches, proceeding from the same stock, and
being conducive to the complete accomplishment of the object, are equally constitutional.”).  
91. 22 U.S. at 861 (the Bank cannot “effect its object unless it be endowed with that
faculty of lending and dealing in money, which is conferred by its charter”). 
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governmental functions.92  This indeed repudiates a major, albeit 
unelaborated premise of McCulloch. 
Further, Jackson’s arguments against the monopoly charter 
based on the Patent-Copyright and Needful Buildings Clauses 
suggest the outline of a narrowing construction that could be 
imposed on McCulloch’s conception of implied powers.  Under 
this argument, selected enumerated powers would be interpreted 
pursuant to a rigorous application of the expressio unius canon to 
restrict the powers that could be implied under other enumerated 
powers.  For instance, the issuance of paper money might be 
conducive to regulating interstate commerce under McCulloch, 
but it would be barred by the Coinage Clause, which authorizes 
the minting of metallic currency without mentioning paper 
money.  This strict expressio unius approach to implied powers 
was never embraced by the Supreme Court, and indeed it is 
unsustainable, though Taney (the Veto Message’s primary 
ghostwriter) would later resort to it privately in an unpublished 
opinion arguing that the Civil War military draft was 
unconstitutional.93 
Curiously, Jackson does not boldly embrace these conflicts 
and tensions with McCulloch.  Contrary to Daniel Walker Howe’s 
suggestion, nowhere does Jackson “rehash[] arguments against 
the constitutionality of the Bank,”94 if by that is meant the 
arguments of Jefferson in cabinet and the Bank’s challengers 
before the bar in McCulloch.  Jackson does not employ 
Jefferson’s argument that implied powers extend only to those 
means that are “absolutely necessary,” without which the express 
92. See MARVIN MEYERS, THE JACKSONIAN PERSUASION: POLITICS AND BELIEF 6-
7, 12-17 (1957). 
93. Military conscription is necessary and proper to the power to raise armies, see U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12, but Taney argued that such an implied power violated the militia 
clauses, which he construed as providing the only constitutionally recognized compulsory 
form of military service.  Roger B. Taney, Thoughts on the Conscription Law of the United 
States (1863), in MARTIN ANDERSON, THE MILITARY DRAFT: SELECTED READINGS ON 
CONSCRIPTION, 207, 213 (1982).  The expressio unius approach necessarily cherry-picks its 
limitations, making it unprincipled as well as unsustainable.  The constitutional order has 
always, and necessarily, recognized implied powers that violate expressio unius.  For 
example, Congress has always been acknowledged to have an implied power to enforce any 
of its enumerated powers with criminal sanctions, despite the fact that the Constitution 
enumerates powers to create three specific criminal laws for counterfeiting, piracy, and 
treason. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 6, 10; art. III, § 3, cl. 2.  See Schwartz, A Question 
Perpetually Arising, supra note 78, at 601-03. 
94. HOWE, supra note 1, at 379-80. 
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powers would be rendered “nugatory.”95  Again, Jackson accepts 
Marshall’s broader definition of “necessary and proper.”  Nor 
does Jackson reject or offer “a detailed critique” of “Marshall’s 
specific constitutional reasoning.”96  By framing the arguments as 
addressing constitutional questions left open by the Supreme 
Court, Jackson pushed his disagreements with McCulloch under 
the table and deprived his departmentalism of most of its force. 
IV. THE BANK VETO AS A TANEY COURT
ROADMAP 
The First and Second Banks of the United States, though 
hugely important, represented a single policy initiative.  The 
United States was able to thrive without a national bank, and 
constitutional law eventually embraced an expansive vision of 
federal legislative authority without a national bank standing as a 
constant reminder.  McCulloch v. Maryland has come to be 
understood as landmark case, not because the Bank was an 
enduring institution – it was not – but because the decision’s 
expansive implications for implied federal powers came to be 
realized. 
In this sense, the Bank Veto Message did not directly defy 
McCulloch, but it contained the seeds of a jurisprudence that 
would undermine McCulloch for the next century.  The aspect of 
the Veto Message that did this is subtle and has tended to escape 
notice. 
A. UNDERMINING MCCULLOCH
The key passage, which has largely escaped the attention of 
conventionalists and revisionists alike, comes at paragraphs 38 to 
40 and involved the question of state taxes.  Once again, rather 
than directly defying McCulloch, Jackson purported to agree with 
it.  McCulloch’s second holding, after affirming the 
constitutionality of the Bank, was that Maryland could not tax the 
bank.  “The principle is conceded,” Jackson wrote, “that the 
95.  See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Washington (Feb. 15 1791), reprinted
in 6 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 197-04, (Paul L. Ford ed., 1904) (emphasis 
added). 
96. Magliocca, supra note 38, at 130; WHITTINGTON, supra note 6, at 59.
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States can not rightfully tax the operations of the General 
Government.”97  But this tax exemption, Jackson maintained, 
could not extend to the Bank’s private, for-profit operations, as 
opposed to its direct services to the federal government.98  
McCulloch did not address this distinction; Osborn did, and there, 
Marshall found the private and public functions of the Bank to be, 
if not inseparable, then at least sufficiently intertwined to make 
all of the Second Bank’s operations exempt from state taxes.99  
While this passage defies Osborn and, indirectly, McCulloch, the 
defiance is muted as with the other objections to the Bank Bill, 
since Jackson framed this “private” element of the tax exemption 
as “not . . . necessary.”100 
It is the next paragraph, elaborating on the objection to a 
state tax exemption, that is the most momentous in the entire Veto 
Message.  Jackson argued that implied powers are not “so 
absolute” that they may “take[] away . . . rights scrupulously 
[granted] to the [s]tates.”101  If the Supreme Court will not impose 
limits on implied powers, then “it becomes us to proceed in our 
legislation with the utmost caution” where an implied power 
intrudes on reserved state powers.102 
Though not directly, our own powers and the rights of the 
States may be indirectly legislated away in the use of means 
to execute substantive powers. We may not enact that 
Congress shall not have the power of exclusive legislation 
over the District of Columbia, but we may pledge the faith 
of the United States that as a means of executing other 
powers it shall not be exercised for twenty years or forever. 
We may not pass an act prohibiting the States to tax the 
banking business carried on within their limits, but we may, 
as a means of executing our powers over other objects, place 
that business in the hands of our agents and then declare it 
exempt from State taxation in their hands. Thus may our own 
powers and the rights of the States, which we can not directly 
97. Id. at 1150.
98. Id. 
99. Osborn, 22 U.S. at 859-71.
100. Jackson, “Veto Message”, supra note 2, at 1151 (emphasis in original).
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
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curtail or invade, be frittered away and extinguished in the 
use of means employed by us to execute other powers.103 
Let us put aside the argument that Congress was 
unconstitutionally frittering away its own powers.  This was 
merely a blind, or a rhetorical, trick for Jackson to tweak his 
nationalist opponents in Congress.  As noted, virtually any 
legislative choice precludes alternatives for at least a time, and it 
is absurd to say that Congress is powerless to choose one means 
because doing so foregoes another.  The real point of this passage 
is the one about implied powers and states’ reserved powers.  To 
the nineteenth-century legal mind, an express delegation of power 
to the national government normally meant a denial of that power 
to the states.104  Jackson’s real objection was that “the rights of 
the States may be indirectly legislated away in the use of means 
to execute [federal] substantive powers” – implied powers, as 
explained by McCulloch.105  To Jackson, and perhaps more 
importantly, to Roger Taney, his legally sophisticated ghost-
writer, the reserved powers of the states imposed an implied 
limitation on the reach of implied powers under McCulloch. 
B. THE FATE OF MCCULLOCH IN THE TANEY
COURT 
Three years almost to the day after the Bank Veto Message, 
on July 6, 1835, John Marshall died.  Roger Taney was confirmed 
as Chief Justice on March 28, 1836 and served until his death in 
1864.106 
McCulloch was never overruled by the Taney Court.  Some 
conventionalists have argued that McCulloch was saved from that 
103. Id. at 1152.
104. David S. Schwartz, An Error and an Evil: the Strange History of Implied
Commerce Powers, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 927, 940-46 (2019).  See, e.g., Ableman v. Booth, 62 
U.S. 506, 506 (1859) (stating “[t]he sovereignty of the United States and of a State are 
distinct and independent of each other within their respective spheres of action”). 
105. Jackson, “Veto Message”, supra note 2, at 1152; McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 405-08
(emphasis added). 
106. 2 DAVID G. SAVAGE, GUIDE TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 939 (4th ed. 2004).
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fate only because Jacksonian presidents vetoed every 
congressional attempt to recharter a national bank, preventing a 
new national bank challenge from reaching the Court.  This 
argument is wrong on two counts.  First, McCulloch’s doctrine 
extended beyond the Bank, to the matter of implied congressional 
powers in general.  The Taney Court did not need a bank case to 
overrule McCulloch – any implied powers case would do.  And 
many implied powers cases did reach the Court in the Taney 
era.107  The Taney Court flirted with the narrow Jeffersonian 
formulation of implied powers as limited to those “absolutely 
necessary,” but never clearly embraced it.108 
Second, the Taney Court showed no inclination to overrule 
any Marshall Court precedent, though it disagreed with many.  
The Taney Court never overruled a single Supreme Court 
decision in its 28 years, and in case after case, the Taney Court 
simply distinguished or ignored disfavored Marshall Court 
precedents.109  There is little or no evidence that the Taney Court 
was inclined to overrule McCulloch in particular.110 
Instead, the Taney Court was determined to  ignore and 
erode McCulloch. The Bank Veto Message supplied the road 
map, and the Court wasted little time in following it.  In Taney’s 
first full term, the Court issued its opinion in New York v. Miln 
(1837).111  There, the Taney Court first laid out its theory of the 
107. See, e.g., United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. 72 (1838) (implied power to regulate
salvage from shipwrecks above the tide line); United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. 560 (1850) 
(implied power to punish the crime of uttering); Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. 410 (1847) (same); 
Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842) (implied power to enforce Fugitive Slave Clause); 
Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (implied power to govern territories); United 
States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. 526 (1840) (same); Searight v. Stokes, 44 U.S. 151 (1845) (implied 
power to contract for mail delivery service); Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. 
443 (1851) (implied power to confer admiralty jurisdiction).  
108. See Marigold, 50 U.S. at 567 (upholding implied power to punish the passing, as
opposed to making, of counterfeit coin because failure to do so would have rendered the 
coinage power “immediately vain and useless,” and left “the government . . . disabled and 
impotent to the only means of securing the objects in contemplation.”) (emphasis added).  
109. See, e.g., Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 36 U.S. 257 (1837) (eroding Craig v.
Missouri, 29 U.S. 410 (1830)); Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (1837) 
(undermining Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819)); Veazie v. Moor, 55 
U.S. 568 (1853) (narrowing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824)). 
110. Those espousing the contrary view rely heavily on the fulminations of Senator
Thomas Hart Benton, who never sat on the Court. See Magliocca, supra note 38, at 130-32 
(citing Benton’s statements attacking McCulloch). 
111. 36 U.S. 102 (1837).
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relationship between implied powers and state reserved powers, 
and its similarities to the Bank Veto are striking.112 
Miln involved a challenge to a New York law that required 
ships landing in New York harbor to report identifying 
information on all foreign or interstate passengers, and to post a 
bond to cover the costs of maintenance or removal of 
impoverished immigrants.113  The law plainly regulated interstate 
and foreign commerce.  Congress had previously imposed similar 
regulations on arriving immigrants, and Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) 
had suggested that states could not regulate interstate and foreign 
passenger navigation, which was commerce, at least where 
Congress had regulated it.114  But the Miln Court upheld the law 
on the ground that it was a “police” regulation designed to aid the 
state’s ability to control immigration so as to “guard against” “the 
moral pestilence of paupers, vagabonds, and possibly 
convicts.”115 The Court characterized the law as an internal police 
law rather than a regulation of commerce, and thus “the exercise 
of a power which rightfully belonged to the states.”116 
Miln demonstrated that the Taney Court would uphold state 
laws that could plausibly be characterized as police regulations, 
irrespective of their effect on foreign or interstate commerce.  But 
more than that, Miln developed a doctrine that effectively 
undermined McCulloch.  Written by the states’-rights firebrand, 
Justice Phillip Barbour of Virginia, Miln asserted that when a 
state acts within “the legitimate scope of its power as to the end 
to be attained, it may use whatsoever means, being appropriate to 
that end, it may think fit; although they may be the same, or so 
nearly the same, as scarcely to be distinguishable from those 
adopted by congress acting under a different power[.]”117  In the 
absence of a direct “collision” with federal law—and the Court 
found none here—the state had “not only the right, but the 
bounden and solemn duty. . .to advance the safety, happiness and 
prosperity of its people, and to provide for its general welfare, by 
any and every act of legislation, which it may deem to be 
112. Id. at 137-38.
113. Id. at 130-31.
114. 22 U.S. at 203-204. 
115. 36 U.S. at 142.
116. Id. at 132.
117. Id. at 137. 
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conducive to these ends[.]”118  When it came to “all those powers 
which relate to merely municipal legislation, or what may, 
perhaps, more properly be called internal police,. . . the authority 
of a state is complete, unqualified, and exclusive.”119 
Miln was a reserved-powers manifesto, and it reversed 
McCulloch in two respects.  First, it suggested that the states’ 
reserved powers could defeat at least some plausible claims of 
implied powers under McCulloch.  Barbour said that state police 
powers are “exclusive,” suggesting that such a regulatory subject-
matter was off limits to assertions of implied federal powers.120  
Second, Miln indicated that state police powers carry implied 
powers that may extend into the ambit of the federal commerce 
power.  The New York statute, by imposing reporting obligations 
on entering ships, did not directly regulate the entry of foreign 
paupers into the state, but instead regulated navigation as a means 
to that end.121  Miln therefore suggested that if the end was 
legitimate—within state police powers—states could use 
legislative means that were indistinguishable from commerce 
regulation.122  Miln largely nullified McCulloch’s primary 
holding about implied powers, and reversed its thrust by 
acknowledging the implied powers of states to regulate in areas 
expressly delegated to the Union. 
The Miln Court consisted of six states’-rights-oriented 
justices plus Justice Joseph Story, the lone dissenter.123  Five of 
the majority justices were Jackson appointees,124 and Barbour, the 
opinion’s author, had been confirmed by the Senate the same day 
as Taney.125  Whether or not Taney directly influenced Barbour’s 
analysis in the Miln case itself, it should hardly be surprising that 
the opinion espoused Jacksonian constitutional thinking. 
118. Id. at 139 (emphasis added).
119. Id. (emphasis added).
120. Miln, 36 U.S. at 139.
121. See id. at 142-43. 
122. Id. at 133 (“we hold that both the end and the means here used, are within the
competency of the states”); id. at 137 (state police power laws are constitutional “[a]lthough 
the means used in their execution may sometimes approach [federal legislative means], so 
nearly as to be confounded”). 
123. David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Contracts and
Commerce, 1836-1864, 1983 DUKE L. J. 471, 472, 477 (1983). 
124. Id. at 472. 
125. Id. at 475; THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 466
(Michael I. Urofsky ed., 1994). 
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Read retrospectively in light of Miln, the brief but pivotal 
passage about legislative means and states’ rights in Jackson’s 
Bank Veto Message lays out a road map for undermining, but not 
openly defying, McCulloch.  Attorney General Taney was a 
sophisticated lawyer.  It is plausible to suppose that by 1832 he 
was already envisioning a post-Marshall Supreme Court.  Why 
damage the prestige and authority of a Court that would soon be 
packed with Jacksonian justices espousing a new Jacksonian 
jurisprudence?  Taney thus may have intentionally exercised a 
moderating influence on the Bank Veto Message’s 
departmentalism.  There was no need to defy McCulloch when it 
could be subtly undermined without undermining the prestige of 
the Court.  That was certainly the tack taken by the Taney Court, 
which did not overrule a single judicial precedent, choosing 
instead to reinterpret, distinguish or ignore the Marshall Court 
decisions it found uncongenial.  If these suppositions are correct, 
the claim by conventionalists that the Taney Court was primed to 
overrule McCulloch is wrong. 
CONCLUSION 
In its aftermath, Jackson’s Bank Veto Message acquired a 
double-character.  The text of the document pursued a subtle 
doctrinal dispute with McCulloch, undermining Marshall’s great 
decision without confronting it directly.  Viewed this way, the 
Bank Veto Message reads less like a departmentalist manifesto 
than like a judicial opinion that erodes, but declines to overrule, a 
disfavored precedent.  So viewed, the document belongs as much 
to the mind and will of Roger Taney as it does to that of Andrew 
Jackson. 
Yet Taney’s masterly subtlety seems to have been utterly 
lost on Bank Veto Message’s audience.  Politicians and 
journalists of the day uniformly read it as a blunt and brash assault 
on the authority of the Supreme Court and as a rejection of 
McCulloch.  And the Democratic Party made a broad reading of 
the Veto Message an article of faith, resolving in five successive 
party platforms from 1840 through 1856 that Congress had no 
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power to charter a national bank.126  This defiant-departmentalist 
reading of the Bank Veto Message may have been strategic, at 
least on the part of Whig opponents of Jackson who had an 
incentive to enlist the prestige of the Court in its largely 
congressional opposition to “King Andrew.” 
The defiant-departmentalist reading of the Bank Veto 
Message received perhaps its biggest boost from Abraham 
Lincoln.  In his senate campaign against Stephen Douglas, 
Lincoln relied heavily on Jackson’s Bank Veto as precedent for 
his departmentalist opposition to Dred Scott. 
You remember we once had a national bank.  Some man 
owed the bank a debt, he was sued and sought to avoid 
payment, on the ground that the bank was unconstitutional.  
The case went to the Supreme Court, and then it was decided 
that the bank was constitutional.  The whole Democratic 
party revolted against that decision.  General Jackson 
himself asserted that he, as President, would not be bound to 
hold a national bank to be constitutional, even though the 
court had decided it to be so.  He fell in precisely with the 
view of Mr. Jefferson, and acted upon it under his official 
oath, in vetoing a charter for a national bank. The declaration 
that Congress does not possess this constitutional power to 
charter a bank, has gone into the Democratic platforms, at 
their national conventions, and was brought forward and 
reaffirmed in their last convention at Cincinnati. They have 
contended for that declaration, in the very teeth of the 
Supreme Court, for more than a quarter of a century. In fact, 
they have reduced the decision to an absolute nullity.127 
For Lincoln – let us ignore his misstatement of the facts of 
McCulloch – the Jacksonian precedent offered an ironic edge to 
his dispute with the Jacksonian Democrat Douglas and a powerful 
bi-partisan cast to the case against Dred Scott. 
126. National Political Party Platforms, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (all
referenced platforms are accessible at the following links), 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/presidential-documents-archive-
guidebook/national-political-party-platforms [https://perma.cc/9ETK-UWK8] (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2019).  
127. ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIS SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 419-20 (Roy P. Basler ed.
1946). 
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The actual words of a text do not necessarily hold a 
monopoly over the text’s meaning.  The readers of a text – and 
with a text like the Bank Veto Message, perhaps “constituents” is 
a better word – have the right to interpret it carefully, or freely; or 
to privilege a misreading as the authoritative meaning.  Lawyers 
and citizens who say that Brown v. Board of Education128 
overruled Plessy v. Ferguson129 and held that all racial 
segregation violated equal protection of the laws are not wrong, 
even though the text of the Brown opinion refrained from 
overruling Plessy and purported to apply only to public schools.  
There, too, the lawyerly effort to maintain subtle distinctions 
seems to have been utterly lost on the public constituency.  In this 
sense, the conventional account of the Bank Veto Message is not 
wrong. 
But while the conventionalists read the history of the Bank 
Veto Message well, they read the text badly.  And in doing so, 
they miss important meanings and signals intended to be sent by 
important constitutional actors.  In particular, Roger Taney, the 
Veto Message’s ghost writer, may have tried to signal that 
Jacksonian legalists had a plan to undermine McCulloch v. 
Maryland without overruling it, and thereby maintain the prestige 
of a Supreme Court that would take a notably states’-rights turn. 
128. 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954).
129. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
